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In a world where English – and its attendant writing conventions – is the dominant language of
research, it becomes increasingly important to explore academic patterns of writing and teach-
ing, and their related etymologies. In particular, this article investigates the relationship between
the Norwegian “mønster” and the English “monster”, arguing that monsters allow us to make
space for new kinds of writing, new languages of thought. Monstrosity, and monstrous patterns
– meanings that are available in Norwegian rather than English – let slip alternative ways of
thinking about teaching, writing and teaching writing. This is done through an exploration of
the work of the literary critic Barbara Johnson, who gives us three uncanny topics –
prosopopoeia, monuments and repetition compulsion – that help us release the warnings (Latin:
“monere”) from mønstre (Norwegian: “patterns”). The article argues that prosopopoeia, mon-
uments and repetition can help us to hear the monster within mønstrene (the patterns). At the
same time, the paper seeks a critical self-awareness of its status as an English language text about
a Norwegian word. Acknowledging that these conventions are themselves historical and cultural
artefacts – are mønstre – the article therefore tries to interrupt and unravel itself in the hope of
making space for alternative kinds of writing.  
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This is a text
about patterns, repetition and teaching. It
is also a text about flesh and stone, the ani-
mate and inanimate, the monument and
the forgotten. It seeks to explore the Nor-
wegian word “mønster” (“pattern”) and its
etymological connection with the English
word “monster”, and to think through the
implications of this relationship. It does so
by pursuing some of the writing of the lit-
erary critic Barbara Johnson on uncanny
topics such as prosopopoeia, monuments
and repetition. At stake here in particular is
Johnson’s unsettling contention that teach-
ing concerns the repetition of what we do
not yet understand (Johnson 1982), and
her idea of “the thingliness of persons”
(Johnson 2008). Already some monstrous
quality may be making itself apparent: if the
monster concerns crises in categories (see,
for example, Cohen 1996; Mittman 2013;
Steel 2013), then we perhaps detect its ap-
proach in the collapse of teaching into rep-
etition, repetition into non-comprehension,
and persons into things. 
Our focus on Norwegian and English
words, and literary critical concepts, means
that this is a text concerning the relation-
ship between monstrosity, culture and lan-
guage, indebted to deconstructive ap-
proaches to texts (see e.g. Cohen 1996;
Clark 1996; de Man 1986). Perhaps the
most important coordinate here is Jacques
Derrida’s claim that “The future can only
be anticipated in the form of an absolute
danger. It is that which breaks absolutely
with constituted normality and can only be
proclaimed, presented, as a sort of mon-
strosity.” (Derrida 1997, 5). Crucially, he
connects this with writing – it is writing
that opens the way to this future, writing
that creates the future. One writes into the
future and the future comes through writ-
ing. As we shall see, the present text con-
cerns, in part, the dominance of English as
a research language, so we might find an
ethical imperative in this idea: that mon-
sters allow us to make the space for new
kinds of writing, new languages of thought.
Monstrosity, and monstrous patterns –
meanings that are available in Norwegian
rather than English – let slip alternative
ways of thinking about teaching, writing
and teaching writing. As Cohen says, “the
monster always escapes” (Cohen 1996, 4).
A mønster1 is a pattern, but its graphic
similarity to “monster” is not a coinci-
dence. Both words emerge from the Latin
“monere,” to warn or to instruct. Only in
Norwegian can we understand the rich, un-
canny inheritance of patterns, of mønstre –
in a pattern there is a warning, an instruc-
tion, perhaps even a sense of threat. Or to
put it another way – from warnings or in-
structions we derive patterns. But perhaps
we can no longer remember those warn-
ings, and as we repeat our patterns – of
thinking, writing, teaching, what we repeat
is something we do not fully understand. 
The mønsterlig is not a coherent catego-
ry. If we try to translate mønster in a way
that lets through its monstrous Latin roots,
it gathers together various possibilities of
reading and interpretation which may over-
lap or even contradict each other. Here we
might tune our ears to the secret alluded to
in the title: I present here, then, not defini-
tions but rather a set of language effects,
the buried meanings that resonate when we
hear “monster” or “monere” within “møn-
ster”: 
· The concept of a pattern which emerges
from warnings or instructions; we pattern
only because we are warned or instructed;
· A pattern whose history is forgotten, but
which goes on repeating; such that I may
be repeating what I do not understand; in
everyday speech, the word mønster func-
tions without a sense of warning, so pat-
terns may contain meanings that we have
to recover;
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· A pattern or series of categories that warn
of their own collapse, their own impossibil-
ity;
· Just as extracting “warning” from mønster
creates the feeling of adding something to
mønster, the mønsterlig is always in excess
of itself – there is a monstrous surplus to it.
There always seems to be too much møn-
ster, too much of the mønsterlig. The møn-
sterlig does not know where to stop. 
Three ideas from Johnson, as we have
touched on – prosopopoeia, monuments,
and repetition – draw us into an under-
standing of the mønsterlig. It is in some
ways a fiction to separate them out – a
monument, for example, is always connect-
ed with prosopopoeia, the voice of the
dead; and simultaneously, a monument re-
peats, because it commemorates (or, per-
haps, compels a reader or observer to re-
peat, to perform the commemoration).
And, of course, knotting all of this together
is the idea of the pattern, as to repeat is to
create a pattern. All of these motifs tell us
something about mønstre. Drawing them
together is the awful, impossible mønster of
becoming-thing – the way certain concepts
of subjectivity pull us towards stone, inani-
macy, thingness. As Johnson says, “decon-
struction gravitate[s] to the inanimate: Paul
de Man was happiest when proving that
what we take to be human nature is an illu-
sion produced by mechanical means”
(2008, 4). She continues, discussing the
figures of Pygmalion and Medusa:
a person turning to stone is usually bad, while
a stone coming to life is usually desirable. But
perhaps it is the confusion of the two realms
that is really, and unavowedly, attractive.
Walter Benjamin, in his study of the Paris
arcades and the rise of commodity fetishism,
speaks often of “the sex appeal of the inor-
ganic” (2008, 20-21). 
Taken with the figure of prosopopoeia –
which Johnson calls the “talking grave”
(2008, 14), a stone speaking – her work
evinces both a fascination and a concern
with category collapse, “and all the ways
we already treat persons as things, and how
humanness is mired in an inability to do
otherwise” (2008, 2). 
There is a second Nordic dimension to
this discussion. This emerges from my own
reflections as a teacher of English academic
writing in Norway. As many commentators
have observed (for example Canagarajah
2003; Pennycook 1994; Benesch 2009;
Bennett 2014), this is not a neutral activity.
Questions of power are in play when we
talk about an academic lingua franca, be-
cause using the lingua franca means choos-
ing not to use – or being compelled not to
use – one’s own language (if it ever makes
sense to think of a language as ‘mine’). So
across this text, a series of interruptions oc-
curs – breaking its flow, pushing against it,
interrogating it; breaking into the linear
trajectory that characterizes the dominant
form of the ‘academic essay in English’.
This is done out of a recognition that Eng-
lish academic discourse is itself a mønster,
and finding the warnings that lie within it
may interrupt it. English academic dis-
course can look monolithic, can appear es-
sential, but it has a history and its episte-
mologic procedures are the result of specif-
ic cultural circumstances. The breaches in
the present text are reminders that this dis-
course has limits, and that we can step out-
side, across and above them.
PROSOPOPOEIA
Prosopopoeia is the rhetorical figure that
means the speech of the voice of the some-
thing absent, the dead, speech from be-
yond the grave. In her discussion of epi-
taphs, Johnson also figures the ‘talking
grave’ as a warning – which gives us the
suggestion that prosopopoeia is mønsterlig.
It is a category, a pattern, activated by a
warning from within. The “deceased is ani-
mated … only to warn the traveler of mor-
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tality – the corpse speaks, but only of
death”, says Johnson (2008, 14). But as
our subject here is category collapse, of
patterns that are impossible or in excess of
themselves, the image of the ‘talking grave’
reveals that the patterns, or oppositions,
that are collapsing are not only those be-
tween life and death, but also those be-
tween flesh and stone.
Of course, there are those who will try
to stop this – who will say, “This is insup-
portable, patterns and categories must be
preserved, this must cease” – another kind
of warning. In her discussion of monsters
and autobiography, Johnson thinks about
Shelley’s Frankenstein as a kind of autobi-
ography – the mode of autobiography, of
playing with selfhood as a species of mon-
ster, that is left to a woman writer because
the alternative is the “humanistic tradition
in which man is the measure of all things”
(Johnson 2014a, 182). The idea of mon-
strosity as a mode of creativity that over-
runs the limits of a patriarchal humanism is
echoed in her comment that “humanism is
a strategy to stop reading when the text
stops saying what it ought to have said”
(Johnson 2014b, 347). In both cases, hu-
manism is a kind of containment device,
and whatever is outside the human (indeed,
the masculine), must by definition be mon-
strous. There is a correspondence here with
patterns: some are acceptable, and some are
not. Humanism warns of monstrosity:
“No, do not exceed this pattern, the text
has now said what it was meant to say”.
Mønstre are always in excess of themselves,
monstrous patterns that carry us over the
limits of sense, of the oppositions that are
the building blocks of Western philosophy,
into what is impossible to be thought. This
excess means that persons have a “thingli-
ness” (Johnson 2008, passim) and can al-
ways be treated as things. The category
‘person’ ends up containing the category
‘thing’, and vice versa – and graves talk,
stones speak.
One way of thinking about this crum-
bling opposition of flesh and stone leads us
into Freud’s exclamation “saxa loquuntur!”
– stones speak! This is one of the archaeo-
logical metaphors Freud uses for the
process of psychoanalysis, in which the
remnants of a lost civilsation might be in-
terpreted in the present:
Imagine that an employer arrives in a little-
known region where his interest is aroused by
an expanse of ruins, with remains of walls,
fragments of columns, and tablets with half-
effaced and unreadable inscriptions. (…) he
may start upon the ruins, clear away the rub-
bish, and, beginning with the visible remains,
uncover what is buried. If his work is
crowned with success, the results are self-ex-
planatory: the ruined walls are part of the
ramparts of a palace or a treasure house; the
fragments of columns can be filled out into a
temple; the numerous inscriptions, which, by
good luck, may be bilingual, reveal an alpha-
bet and a language, and, when they have
been deciphered and translated, yield un-
dreamed-of information about the events of
the remote past, to commemorate which the
monuments were built. Saxa loquuntur!
(Freud 1962, 192.)
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Interruption #1
What happens to local research cultures when the pressure to publish internationally is
brought to bear on them? How does one carve out space for regional concerns when, pre-
cisely, institutional structures do not reward such a focus? Does the injunction to publish
This could be thought of as a kind of
prosopopoeia. These speaking stones of
Freud correspond with the talking graves
Johnson discusses: (...) “Prosopopoeia does
not create a mouth … so much as reani-
mate one; rhetorically, the dead come alive
and the talking grave reverses the progress
towards death” (Johnson 2008, 14). But
this confusion of life and death, speech and
stone, the animate and inanimate, also
opens for Johnson another confusion, an-
other monstrosity: the asymptotic relation
between things and persons” is haunted by
“the difficulty in being sure that we treat
persons as persons” (Johnson 2008, 2). Our
relations to others, in other words, always
have something to do with prosopopoeia,
with mønstre. They trouble the belief that
“one knows how people act, when in fact
those beliefs may inhere in a linguistic sys-
tem of which its users are not conscious”
(Johnson 2008, 4).  This brings us to the
work of Catherine Malabou, and the idea
of destructive plasticity. Malabou’s philoso-
phy, informed by neuroscience as well as
psychoanalysis, unravels the opposition be-
tween creation and destruction, collapsing
pattern into mønster. She imagines the plas-
ticity of self that allows growth and creativi-
ty as being open, too, to destruction and
accident. The mind and body’s openness to
accident is a component of self ’s plasticity,
so that one can say, in monstrous – møn-
sterlig – fashion that destruction is forma-
tive. “What do we look like”, she asks,
“once we are formed by destructive, explo-
sive, nuclear plasticity?” What becomes of a
face, through age or accident, right before
themoment before death?
How do we look? However beautiful and de-
cisive, we have rejected the figures of trees,
animals, and the fantastic beings described by
Ovid. We no longer look like anything living,
but nor do we look inanimate. We must
imagine something between the animate and
the inanimate, something that is not animate
but has none of the inertia of stone, either.
The inanimal? A between, or an instance that
in no way resembles any intermediary, one
that explodes mediations, outside the soul,
outside the organic (Malabou 2016, 70-71).
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internationally mean that regional research languages and topics are neglected? In such a
willful, or willed, withering would there not be something monstrous? These are not new
questions, of course. Twenty years ago, John Swales published an article called “English as
Tyrannosaurus Rex” in which he grappled with the idea of English as “a powerful carnivore
gobbling up the other denizens of the academic linguistic grazing grounds” (Swales 1997,
374). He is influenced here by Anna Mauranen, who – writing in 1993, at least – saw
Finnish academic writing as distinctly different from English. Mauranen sees the level of
metatext – the language that explicitly organises a text for a reader – in Anglo-American re-
search articles as “reminiscent of another genre – marketing discourse” (Mauranen 1993a,
16). “The main thesis”, she says, “is pointed out repeatedly, so as not to be missed”, which,
she argues, is an instance of “marketing type rhetorical strategies”. Finnish academic dis-
courses, on the other hand, have an “implicit, poetic” dimension (ibid., 17), whereby
things are not spelled out in the same way. It is not that Mauranen thinks that one approach
is better than the other, necessarily; but the dominance of English troubles her, as would
the dominance of any language.
Malabou grapples here with the monstrous
paradox of her premise – that destruction
can be formative, that the self ’s plasticity
can receive accident, that accident is there-
fore essential. These are premises beyond
humanism, beyond ‘what the text ought to
say’. Outside this, there is the mønster of
the inanimal, being neither flesh nor stone
and so taking the properties of both, be-
coming a kind of prosopopoeia. But there
is more to it than this. As Johnson says,
prosopopoeia can function as a kind of
general condition of reading: “People who
want to summarise Of Grammatology try to
explain what Derrida ‘says’” (Johnson
2008, 14). But a text is, precisely, not ani-
mate; a text does not say, or speak. So the
figure of prosopopoeia carries a risk, a
warning: as Johnson says, recalling Paul de
Man, “there is a latent threat in any anima-
tion of the animate, ‘that the living are
struck dumb, frozen in their own death’”
(Johnson 2008, 39). No reading, there-
fore, without prosopopoeia, and without
finding ourselves caught between flesh and
stone. This is perhaps the real warning of
the ‘talking graves’, the warning that lurks,
monstrously or mønsterlig, forgotten, inside
that particular rhetorical figure. As Nicho-
las Royle puts it, “We are ourselves spoken
by skulls and spirits” (Royle 2003, 281).
MONUMENTS
As we saw earlier, Freud’s the occasion of
Freud’s exclamation “stones speak!” is the
discovery of “monuments”. When we be-
gin speaking about monuments, we are al-
ready talking about repetition (and this
psychoanalytic context gives us another va-
lence to Johnson’s remark about repetition
and understanding – the patient who seeks
WOMEN, GENDER & RESEARCH NO. 2-3 201760
Interruption #2
Elsewhere, Mauranen writes:
Insofar as diversity provides a fruitful basis for innovation, we should encourage the
maintenance of smallish, local academic communities with their own discourse and
rhetorical practices. They should be maintained as cultural rainforests, in order to pre-
serve the possibility of an original contribution to the common pool of scientific
thought. Thus, insofar as rhetorical practices embody thought patterns, we should en-
courage the maintenance of variety and diversity in academic rhetorical patterns – exces-
sive standardisation may counteract innovation and creative thought by forcing them into
standard forms (Mauranen 1993b, 172).  
This, perhaps, opens up a role for monstrosity in academic writing, particularly academic
writing in English – one might seek new forms that contribute to this ecosystem, promote
new kinds of knowledge or new experiences of understanding. One might seek to subvert
the expected patterns of the dominant discourse.
analysis is almost by definition enmeshed in
structures of repetition they cannot under-
stand). A monument compels us to repeat,
to re-imagine, to commemorate. No mon-
ument without repetition, we might say.
But we are also in the realm of proso-
popoeia, because, as Johnson observes, a
monument is another word for tombstone
(Johnson 2008, 35). As we shall see, speak-
ing of monuments is a task for an archaeol-
ogist, but perhaps an excessive task, a mon-
strous one.
If prosopopoeia means becoming stone,
perhaps becoming oneself a monument,
one might experience the physical sensation
of “the angular cut of a shattered word” in
one’s mouth, against the tongue (Derrida
1986, xlviii) – as though a word is a thing.
This uncanny quality of monumentalisation
is built into Jacques Derrida’s essay Fors,
but translation opens another dimension of
this – because we ascribe these words (“the
angular cut of a shattered word”) to Derri-
da, but they are in fact Barbara Johnson’s.
She is the translator of this particular essay,
Fors. And elsewhere, talking about transla-
tions of Walter Benjamin, she refers to what
an English translator “has Benjamin (…)
say” (Johnson 2014c, 385), indicating the
curious intimacy of translator and translat-
ed. The referencing conventions we use ef-
face Johnson and preserve Derrida, but
these are nonetheless Johnson’s English
words. ‘Johnson’ is present in ‘Derrida’.
Prosopopoeia again – who is animating
whom?
Fors is a commentary by Derrida (and
Johnson) on Abraham and Torok’s reopen-
ing of Freud’s “Wolf Man” case. For Derri-
da and Johnson, part of the value of Abra-
ham and Torok’s work is that it enacts the
way theories of subjectivity must also carry
with them something cryptic, something
that is outside the subject (and the theory)
but contained within it. Hence, the crypt is
a kind of ‘artificial unconscious’, something
both inside and outside the self:
Caulked or padded along its inner partition,
with cement or concrete on the other side,
the cryptic safe protects from the outside the
very secret of its clandestine inclusion or in-
ternal exclusion. Is this strange space hermet-
ically sealed? The fact that one must always
answer yes and no to this question that I am
deferring here will have already been apparent
from the topographical structure of the crypt,
on its highest level of generality: the crypt
can constitute its secret only by means of its
division, its fracture. “I” can save an inner
safe only by putting it inside “myself,” be-
side(s) myself, outside (Derrida 1986, xvi).
No theory of subjectivity, then, without a
passenger, without someone repeating
alongside me. To be an automaton, or to
be an automaton’s passenger – this is not
only the psychoanalytic logic of the uncan-
ny, but also of the crypt. I am here, but
something else is here too, running its pro-
gram, repeating and repeating. Again, this
brings us back to the figure of
prosopopoeia: indeed, it begins to turn it
inside out. If I always carry a passenger,
and this passenger is always hidden within
my repetitions – without my ever under-
standing it – prosopopoeia becomes not
merely the voice of the dead, but a kind of
general condition of speaking and thinking
at all. Prosopopoeia is with me when I
speak, or teach; something else is always
animating my words, present alongside me.
“And then I can feel on the tip of my
tongue”, Derrida writes, “the angular cut
of a shattered word.”
This eruptive sentence is part of a pas-
sage that is more than usually hallucinatory,
uncanny:
Striking demonstration of Crytptonomy: the
crack in the symbol, the upright column of a
name, for example, or the blank voice of a
scruple, always extends out on the other side,
beyond the self.
I am thinking (detached illusion) of the
palaeontologist standing motionless, sudden-
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ly, in the sun, bewitched by the delicate stay
of a word-thing, an abandoned stone instru-
ment, like a tombstone burning in the grass,
the double-edged stare of a two-faced
Medusa.
And then I can feel, on the tip of my
tongue, the angular cut of a shattered word.
What are we to do with this mysterious
text? We began with the threatening feeling
that flesh and stone, the animate and inani-
mate, might collapse into one another, and
here it happens: we find, in our own
mouths, words that have become stones,
tombstones, things. It manifests a symbol,
first, as a physical thing: something that
may contain a crack. We have seen that it
does the same thing with a word – a thing
that can be shattered, angular. And again –
a name can be an upright column, as one
might find at the site of a classical ruin. But
the column at the same time is not upright
– it “extends out on the other side” as
though it has fallen. At the same time: “out
of the other side” of what? Of me? The im-
possibility of parsing the topology here
means it begins to resemble another impos-
sible site: Freud’s image of Rome, all the
eras of its construction rising impossibly
through one another, as a model for the
preservative dimension of the unconscious
(Freud 1991, 79). The contradictory topo-
graphy, the outside made inside and death
of all space, comes to an apotheosis in the
phrase we began with: on the tip of his
tongue, Derrida feels this angular cut of a
shattered word. Where is the cut? Is it that
a cut has occurred on his tongue, or is oc-
curring at this moment? Or: do we follow
the genitive, and see the cut as somehow
the property of the shattered word – a cut
that has occurred in the materiality of the
word? Is the cut the pressure of the shat-
tered word’s sharp edges? And why on the
tip of the tongue, this phrase that means
the uncanny sensation of being about – of
needing – to say something that you can-
not quite remember?
And then: a “word-thing” that is also a
stone, both an abandoned stone instru-
ment and a tombstone. Again, this creates a
kind of inescapable pressure in the text:
there is no way to know what a stone in-
strument might be, or if an instrument can
be stone. One could never know what pur-
pose it might have, if it were a compass or a
sextant, and whether a stone compass or
sextant could ever be used, could ever actu-
ally be an instrument. Or, were it another
kind of instrument, what music might be
struck from it. 
To follow through the strange, sundered
logic of this text, and its relationship to
teaching and repetition, we need to focus
on an apparently insignificant detail. First,
we might note, that when Derrida says
“detached illusion”, he means that it is an
illusion that he and the motionless palaeon-
tologist are separate. The logic of the crypt
means that he both is and is not this other.
To think of them as separate is, precisely, il-
lusory. But more importantly – why “sun”?
No doubt in part because it is one element
in the Verbarium that Abraham and Torok
construct from the Wolf Man’s speech. But
also because it repeats the experience of
someone quite close in quarries and fasci-
nations, to the palaeontologist – the ar-
chaeologist. 
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Interruption #3
A further step is taken by Karen Bennett, who observes a continuity of style across what she
calls English Academic Discourse (EAD), from the physical sciences to the humanities, but
Freud is present, if that is the right word, in
this passage too, at once sundering it and
structuring it. It is the archaeologist Freud,
the collector of antiquities, who is, as Der-
rida puts it in Archive Fever, “this brother
to Hanold,” comparing him to the protag-
onist of Jensen’s Gradiva (Derrida 1998,
92), because of his love of archaeological
metaphors.  Saxa loquuntur – stones speak.
Such is Freud’s metaphor for a successful
analysis. But here, something stranger is
going on – Freud’s analogy is being some-
how de-analogised in Derrida’s text so that
words become things, stones become
words. And then, there is the presence of
the sun – Derrida “motionless in the sun,
bewitched by the stay of a delicate word-
thing” – this brings Hanold much more
clearly into view, because Hanold’s delu-
sion – of Gradiva – takes as its element the
sunlight. Gradiva is the “noonday ghost,”
Jensen (1918, 57) tells us, and sunlight al-
ways accompanies her appearance. So this
combination of monuments means that
Derrida repeats Hanold as well as Freud,
and in doing so, teaches us what he does
not understand. But what is this? The suc-
cession of references in Gradiva that that
describe Hanold’s solar delusion work their
way forward into Derrida / Johnson’s text.
They repeat them, and something else be-
comes present in this repetition. And, let us
not forget, Derrida / Johnson are teachers
who repeat unconsciously the experience of
a (fictional) teacher, as Hanold holds the
university position of docent. The “de-
tached illusion” in the sun, the sunstruck
contemplations of a palaeontologist who is
really an archaeologist, bend Derrida’s
(Johnson’s) text into their path. There is a
trace of this also in Derrida’s note at the
end of Archive Fever, that he is writing “on
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seeks also to complicate it. Discussing a textbook by Bryan Greetham (2008), How to Write
Better Essays, she dryly points out that “he uses an interesting authority to support his call
for clarity, conciseness and economy”, the hallmarks of plain style. Greetham ties these
virtues back to “what the Reverend Samuel Wesley once described as ‘the dress of thought:
a modest dress, neat but not gaudy’”. Bennett comments:
Here, finally, we find an oblique reference to the historical origins of English writing
style. For, as this brief quotation suggests, the virtues that it encapsulates are above all
Protestant virtues – virtues which are manifested not only textually, but in all aspects of
life, from dress taste and social style to financial habits. Hence, Greetham has unwittingly
undermined the absolute claims made by most of the other authors in this survey. In
highlighting the historic roots of the English taste in written style, he emphasises its cul-
turally contingent nature, thereby leaving the door open for the affirmation of other
styles which, owing to a diverging historical trajectory, may embody qualities that are en-
tirely different (Bennett 2009, 53). 
If, indeed, these virtues are historically determined, perhaps it is the duty of the writing
teacher to encourage students to interrogate them, think beyond them, change them.
the rim of Vesuvius” (Derrida 1998, 97).
This remark can also be thought of as plac-
ing him in the role of “brother to Hanold”
– repeating Freud, repeating Jensen.
And Freud, too, describes an experience
in the sun that is deranged, hallucinatory.
An experience that also takes place in an
Italian town. Freud is explicit that this is an
experience of repetition, although it cannot
be. It is, perhaps, though, an instance of
the mønsterlig, that paranoid, pattern-seek-
ing faculty. Freud writes:
[Repetition] does undoubtedly, subject to
certain conditions and combined with certain
circumstances, arouse an uncanny feeling,
which, furthermore, recalls the helplessness
experienced in some dream-states.(…) I was
walking, one hot summer afternoon, through
the deserted streets of a provincial town in
Italy (…) I found myself in a quarter of
whose character I could not long remain in
doubt. (…) I hastened to leave the narrow
street at the next turning. But after having
wandered about for a time without enquiring
my way, I suddenly found myself back in the
same street, where my presence was now be-
ginning to excite attention. I hurried away
once more, only to arrive by another détour
at the same place yet a third time. Now, how-
ever, a feeling came over me that I can only
describe as uncanny (…) (Freud 1955, 237).
This is no doubt uncanny. But is it repeti-
tious? Surely a town cannot repeat? And yet
– stones speak. Derrida repeats, transmits
these repetitions from Jensen and Freud.
And in the repetition they thicken, become
thing-like. Everything congeals in repeti-
tion. 
The perverse remembering that animates
Derrida’s (Johnson’s) text here returns us
to the idea of the monument. Cryptonomy,
like all mourning, is a form of remem-
brance, memorialization or monumentalisa-
tion. And here, in its becoming-stone, it
steers towards the threat of inanimacy that
Johnson recalls from de Man. “A monu-
ment, then”, she writes, “is supposed to
confer on memory the immortality that on-
ly inanimate things can possess. It seeks (…
) to honour something mere living memo-
ry might forget, or something that de-
mands a collective, not individual, re-
sponse” (Johnson 2008, 39). But “the
durability and decontextualisation involved
in canonical art” is precisely what may en-
danger the memory of what is preserved –
art travels from context to context, inter-
pretation to interpretation. This process of
recontextualisation and reinterpretation an-
imates. But preserved inside the monu-
ment, its secret, is the desire to reach out
to the observer and confer its memory per-
fectly, to activate the stony, prosopopoeic
recesses of the soul, and enjoin the observ-
er to become stone altogether.
REPETITION COMPULSION
If prosopopoeia is the voice of something
absent, the voice of something dead, this
may be what lies behind Johnson’s idea
that teaching is the repetition of what we
do not yet understand. We do not under-
stand whatever it is that haunts us as we
speak to students in a classroom, and we
are unaware of what lies behind the repeat-
ed patterns of our speech, these mønstre. 
Nicholas Royle follows through John-
son’s idea with the feeling of disgust in
teaching. Recalling Freud’s observations
that there is something uncanny in “im-
pression of automatic, mechanical processes
at work behind the ordinary appearance of
mental activity” and in “Whatever reminds
us of this inner ‘compulsion to repeat’”,
Royle goes on to talk about the disgusting
– we might say monstrous – feelings that
occur with the dependence in teaching on
repetition:
Teaching, and indeed even talking about
teaching, can seem quite disgusting. So-called
theories of education have perhaps taken in-
sufficient account of such disgust. There is
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something disgusting, incipiently uncanny,
perhaps, about the experience of repetition in
talking to students, in memorizing or trying
to memorize their names, in finding oneself
seeming to say or being on the verge of say-
ing exactly the same thing as one did an hour,
or a day, or a year before (Royle 2003, 61-
62).
Appropriately for a chapter on teaching and
the uncanny, there is a psychoanalytic logic
to this – it is not just that Royle repeats,
but that one ‘finds oneself ’ in the process
of repetition. A sense of blankness, of de-
personalization, passes through both the
pronoun and the verb – ‘oneself ’ (I am
talking about myself, but have now
bleached myself out with the use of this
generalized pronoun), and ‘finds’ (I did
not choose to do this, I have suddenly real-
ized I am running a program, something is
talking while I am merely a passenger). He
brings this observation into contact with
the remark from Johnson that we started
with – the idea that “teaching is a compul-
sion: a compulsion to repeat what one has
not yet understood” (1982, v). Perhaps
some of this disgust, then, encodes the fear
that one – I – will never understand; that
what haunts my repetition, what secretly
structures it, what cannot be found in it,
will never be something that ‘one’ / ‘I’ un-
derstand(s). 
In this repeating, or being on the verge
of repeating – it is as though something is
on the tip of one’s tongue – 
When Johnson starts working with this
idea, she is compelled by one of the con-
cluding stanzas of Coleridge’s Ancient
Mariner:
I pass, like night, from land to land; 
I have strange power of speech; 
That moment that his face I see, 
I know the man that must hear me: 
To him my tale I teach (Coleridge 2000, 437). 
Johnson notes that the poem and the gloss
it includes “disagree slightly over the na-
ture of the act to teaching they describe.
While in the gloss the mariner ‘teaches (…)
love and reverence,’ in the poem he teaches
only his ‘tale’”. She goes on to argue that
the gloss’s didactic quality, then, “stands
for a pedagogy that would repress the very
stuff literature is made of” (Johnson 1982,
v). A “reading of the mariner himself”, on
the other hand, “would suggest that teach-
ing is a compulsion: a compulsion to repeat
what one has not yet understood”. 
THREE VIEWS OF A SECRET: THE “MØNSTERLIG” 65
interruption #4
Bennett’s work puts the construction of EAD into a historical context. She elaborates on
her experiences as a translator between English and Portuguese, describing the tension be-
tween the rich, poetic, grammatically complex prose of Portuguese humanities writing, and
the pre-existing shapes of EAD she must contort it into in translation. But there is also the
implication in her work that EAD has in some sense colonized itself, in the way the posi-
tivist, empiricist language of the scientific revolution spread to other disciplines. She writes:
With the growing status of the natural sciences, the new kind of impersonal discourse ac-
quired prestige and began to spread to other areas. Its associations with the bourgeoisie,
which in the 17th century was the social class in the ascendancy, also linked it firmly to
But what might it mean to teach a tale?
When the wedding guest, and all the others
who have been taught this tale, recall it,
what are they recalling? Johnson, observing
the discontinuity between the poem and
the gloss, discounts the idea that the
mariner teaches a moral. The gloss sup-
presses the stuff of literature, she says, and
the poem teaches instead … what? The
mariner teaches a tale – but what is the re-
sponse of the student? The mariner does
not merely explain his tale, or recount it –
he teaches it. And yet it seems unsatisfacto-
ry to say that he teaches the gist, the facts
of it. Surely this would be too close to the
gloss, and not really teaching at all, there-
fore. I find myself left with the uncanny
feeling that the mariner teaches the poem,
that is, the poem word for word – his
“strange power of speech” is the power to
inculcate repetition, to pass on exactly that
strange power of speech. To teach, in other
words, repetition. To teach a listener, to
compel a listener, to repeat the poem. To
make the listener him. It returns us to the
idea that prosopopoeia is a general condi-
tion of reading and thinking, or being – I
am always something other than myself. In
this, it also returns us to the monstrous
mode of autobiography that Johnson talks
about – to talk about myself exceeds the
limits of humanist reading. I am, impossi-
bly, not me and me at the same time. Such
is the mønster of autobiography, its møn-
sterlig perversions and compulsions.
There is, perhaps, another level to this
too, directly connected with the disgust
Royle mentions. The compulsion to repeat
what one has not understood sounds like
the monstrous itself – a conjoining of two
things that are antithetical, the meaning
and the meaningless. How much knowl-
edge, unconscious and undreamt of, and at
the same time on the tip of the teacher’s
tongue, is encrypted in this strange scene?
How can one repeat what one has not yet
understood – not only not understood but
not known, not experienced, not encoun-
tered? How can one repeat what has not
yet come to light? Or, to put it another way
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the structures of wealth and power in the new social configuration. Thus began the pro-
cess of colonization of other disciplines, beginning with the social sciences … and mov-
ing on to all areas of knowledge in western society, even to less tangible domains like lit-
erature and art criticism (Bennett 2007, 160).
She continues, describing a survey she conducted among academic staff about their use of
English: 
One sociologist was particularly damning: “English discourse is impoverished and dogmat-
ic. The questions raised at the outset are simplistic, and formulated in such a way as to re-
quire a YES/NO type of response, based upon mathematical models that tell us very little
about reality. This is how they legitimize their science, grounding it in the logic of posi-
tivism” (Bennett 2007, 164).
– what else can one repeat?
The teacher cannot perceive the møn-
sterlig, what is behind the patterns of his or
her speech. It is only another, an other,
who can do that work. Royle’s disgust
might be further understood if we place it
alongside another remark from Derrida,
one of his most well-known evocations of
the monster:
the future is necessarily monstrous: the figure
of the future, that is, that which can only be
surprising, that for which we are not pre-
pared, you see, is heralded by species of mon-
sters. A future that would not be monstrous
would not be a future; it would already be a
predictable, calculable, and programmable to-
morrow. All experience open to the future is
prepared or prepares itself to welcome the
monstrous arrivant (Derrida 1995b, 386–
387.)
This, then, some essence of the mønsterlig
– it is disgusting, to be sure, the repetition
nauseates me, but this is in part because it
is of the other and for the other. There is
always a passenger, a crypt, in my repeti-
tion. But I will never know the secret of it
– I will never understand the pattern. That
is the work of another, perhaps, indeed, a
student. So the repetition opens into the
future. It is on the tip of the tongue, and
someone, unbeknownst to me, in my fu-
ture, may hear this, may hear whatever it is
that is encoded inside or onto mønstrene.
And be therefore a party to and recipient of
the revelation I can never bear witness to. 
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Interruption #5
A. Suresh Canagarajah discuss the idea of code-switching in a language-learning context,
whereby language learners can benefit from moving between languages as they speak
(Canagarajah 2003, 131). Perhaps there is scope to adapt this idea, to bring, for example,
Norwegian or other Nordic words into English. Mauranen suggests that Finnish patterns of
thought might be preserved even when writing in English; but perhaps English writers, too,
can seek out the habits of thought and speech that characterize other scholarly cultures. I
have been thinking, alongside these remarks, of the Norwegian words that translate
prosopopoeia – personifikasjon (personification) and besjeling (giving soul to – literally, en-
soulment). The idea that to be given personhood, and soul, are different is something I find
compelling and fascinating, and I wonder if it tells us something more about the mønsterlig
dimensions of prosopopoeia we have been discussing.
Final Interruption
Perhaps, over the course of these remarks about predatory discourses, the reader has
thought, “Well, why didn’t you do …” or “couldn’t you have …” or “Could you not have
written …” Perhaps I could have; perhaps I was unable to; perhaps I will be able to try,
next time. But if you have felt that these interruptions do not push forcefully enough, do
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The mønsterlig, we said at the beginning, is
not a coherent category. How could it be?
Too many things are released from the
combination of mønster and its Latin origin
(again, the excess – adding the origin to
the present) for the mønster’s warnings to
be coherent. Over the course of this discus-
sion, we have been thinking about the way
the uniqueness of the Norwegian word
mønster gives us an opportunity to think
about the monstrous in other languages
and other contexts, too. Because of its ex-
cessiveness, its uncanny supplementarity, it
demands that we look for collapsing cate-
gories, for flesh becoming stone, repetition
becoming thing. The mønster warns that
we cannot hold these categories separate.
And not least when they concern the fu-
ture. We have always been heading to this
point, perhaps – that to talk about the
mønster we would have to talk about the
future, because the future is opened by a
warning. One future, at any rate. But even
in this, we are at risk of category collapse.
If someone comes after the teacher who
can attend to their patterns more clearly,
detect in them whatever was not under-
stood in the present, then that teacher, per-
haps, is becoming monument, stone, and
that stone is reaching out to the student.
NOTES
1. Plural forms: mønstre = patterns; mønstrene =
the patterns. I also suggest here the coinage møn-
sterlig as an adjective – the monstrously patterned.
2. What would the work of Freud look like with-
out literature? Freud’s Delusion and Dream in
Jensen’s Gradiva (1959) is an analysis of Wilhelm
Jensen’s ghost story Gradiva, in which Norbert
Hanold, a young archaeologist and docent, travels
to Pompeii and is haunted by a “noonday ghost”
among the ruins. Freud’s reading is itself the sub-
ject of an analysis by Derrida in Archive Fever
(1998), in which Derrida thinks about Freud’s
own fascination with archaeology and antiquity,
and compares Freud to the protagonist of Gradiva.
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